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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3233  
____________ 
 
IN RE: JAMES ANDERSON, a/k/a J. Hendel, 
      Petitioner 
 __________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from  
the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (Related to D.C. Civ. No. 97-cv-05690)  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21 
September 15, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 30, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner James Anderson, a/k/a James J. Hendel, pleaded guilty to aggravated 
assault and unlawful restraint in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.  On July 8, 
1993, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5-17 years, to be followed by four 
years of probation.  On September 11, 1997, Anderson filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that Anderson‟s 
claims were barred from federal habeas review due to a procedural default, and he could 
not show cause for the default or that failure to consider his claims would result in a 
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fundamental miscarriage of justice, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).  
Anderson appealed, and we denied his application for a certificate of appealability in 
C.A. No. 98-1753 on November 26, 1999. 
 Anderson was paroled on November 6, 2009.  He was rearrested and adjudicated 
guilty of a probation violation on March 16, 2010.  Anderson then was sentenced on the 
probation violation to a new term of imprisonment of 2-4 years, to be followed by one 
year of probation. 
 Recently, Anderson filed an application in this Court, one of many,
1
 for 
authorization to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C § 
2254.  He also filed a motion to be exempt from the filing requirements of Third Cir. 
LAR 22.5.  On April 27, 2011, we issued an Order on Anderson‟s application, granting 
his motion to be exempt from the filing requirements of Third Cir. LAR 22.5, denying his 
application to file another section 2254 petition challenging his 1993 sentence, and 
advising him that he did not need authorization from us to challenge his new sentence of 
2-4 years‟ imprisonment on the probation violation. 
 Anderson now has filed a petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1651, in which he argues that the District Court exceeded its authority in deciding his 
1997 habeas corpus petition by referring to, and relying upon, a transcript from an 
adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court.  Attached to the mandamus 
                                              
1
 In June, 2003, Anderson filed a second habeas corpus petition.  It was transferred to this 
Court to be treated as an application to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), and we denied the application (C.A. No. 04-1527).  In 2005, 
Anderson filed a request for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus 
petition.  We denied the application (C.A. No. 05-2085).  In 2007, Anderson filed a 
request for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition.  We denied 
the application (C.A. No. 07-1099). 
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petition are portions of the District Court‟s Memorandum, which Anderson argues are 
evidence of the District Court‟s having materially misrepresented certain facts concerning 
his offense by relying on this bankruptcy transcript.  Anderson asks that we order the 
District Court to supply him with a copy of this bankruptcy transcript from a hearing held 
on December 15, 1994, because access to it will, he contends, allow him to demonstrate 
actual innocence, and thus his eligibility to file another habeas corpus petition.  See 
Petition, at 3.
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 We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  Our jurisdiction derives from 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of 
mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary situations.  See 
Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  To justify the use of this 
extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a clear and indisputable right to the 
writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired.  See Haines v. 
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).   
Anderson‟s petition does not meet the test for extraordinary relief.  Authorization 
to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition is only granted where the application 
relies “on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” or newly discovered evidence 
                                              
2
 We note that Anderson has filed a separate petition for writ of mandamus, see C.A. No. 
11-3150, in which he stated that he had been unable, in his recent section 2244 
proceedings, to supply us with a copy of his prior section 2254 petition, and, in which he 
asked us to order the District Court to provide him with a copy of this item.  Although 
that petition and the instant petition overlap to some extent, we will not address 
Anderson‟s demand for a copy of his prior section 2254 petition here; that issue will be 
addressed separately in C.A. No. 11-3150. 
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which “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable 
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2244(b)(2)(A) & (B).  Anderson‟s claim that the District Court improperly relied upon 
extra-record evidence and materially misstated the facts concerning his offense does not 
involve a new rule of constitutional law. 
To the extent that Anderson is arguing that the bankruptcy transcript is newly 
discovered evidence, we reject his contention of actual innocence.  In the Memorandum, 
the District Court stated: “Anderson repeatedly assaulted Poole about the face and 
body….  Poole suffered injuries, including an „orbital floor blowout‟ fracture to her right 
eye.  Sent. Hearing Tr. at 12-16.  See also Bankr. No. 93-12285, 94-0891 Tr. at 14 
(discussing other injuries including broken ribs, fractured skull, fractured nose and a 
punctured eardrum).”  See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Exhibit B.  Anderson 
evidently takes issue with the District Court‟s reliance on the bankruptcy transcript to 
note additional injuries to the victim.  The District Court also stated that Anderson “was 
included as a debtor in the bankruptcy and testified at the hearings.”  Id. at Exhibit D.  
Anderson argues that he was a creditor and not a debtor, and that Poole stole his property 
and his money.   
Anderson thus seeks to relitigate the issue of Poole‟s credibility, her motive to lie, 
and the extent of her injuries.  The District Court concluded, however, that the 
bankruptcy proceedings were not relevant to Anderson‟s criminal case and thus his 
habeas corpus petition, stating: “The record shows that [Anderson‟s] guilty plea was 
knowing and voluntary.  There has been no showing of actual innocence.  While 
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[Anderson] has provided the court with a barrage of papers and motions proclaiming his 
innocence, they do not show that he is innocent….  The subsequent bankruptcy and 
disposition of property, whether lawful or not, has no relevance in [Anderson‟s] criminal 
case for aggravated assault and unlawful restraint.”  Id. at Exhibit E.  We agree.  
Anderson has made no showing whatever that the 1994 bankruptcy hearing transcript 
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the 
underlying offense.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).  He has not shown a clear and 
indisputable right to the transcript, and he thus is not entitled to the mandamus relief he 
seeks. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 
